auth/Documentaion/security/REMAINING_SECURITY_GAPS.md

Remaining Security Gaps Analysis

✅ Fully Resolved Issues

1. ✅ Rate Limiting / OTP Throttling

Status: RESOLVED

• Rate limiting implemented per phone and per IP
• OTP request throttling (3 per 10 min, 10 per 24h per phone)
• OTP verification attempt limits (5 per OTP, 10 failed per hour)
• Location: src/middleware/rateLimitMiddleware.js

2. ✅ OTP Exposure in Logs

Status: RESOLVED

• Safe OTP logging helper created (src/utils/otpLogger.js)
• Only logs in development mode
• Never logs to production
• Location: src/services/smsService.js uses logOtpForDebug()

3. ✅ IP/Device Risk Controls

Status: RESOLVED

• IP blocking for configured CIDR ranges
• Risk scoring based on IP/device/user-agent changes
• Suspicious refresh detection
• Location: src/services/riskScoring.js, integrated in src/routes/authRoutes.js

4. ✅ Refresh Token Theft Mitigation

Status: RESOLVED

• Environment fingerprinting (IP, user-agent, device ID)
• Suspicious refresh detection with risk scoring
• Optional OTP re-verification for suspicious refreshes
• Enhanced logging of suspicious events
• Location: src/routes/authRoutes.js (refresh endpoint)

5. ✅ JWT Claims Validation

Status: RESOLVED

• Strict validation of iss, aud, exp, iat, nbf
• Centralized validation function
• Used in all token verification paths
• Location: src/services/jwtKeys.js - validateTokenClaims()

6. ✅ CORS Hardening

Status: RESOLVED

• Strict origin whitelisting
• No wildcard support when credentials involved
• Production requirement for explicit origins
• Location: src/index.js

7. ✅ CSRF Protection (Documented)

Status: RESOLVED (Not needed - using Bearer tokens)

• Comprehensive documentation provided
• Guidance for future cookie-based implementation
• Location: CSRF_NOTES.md

---

⚠️ Partially Resolved Issues

8. ⚠️ Access Token Replay Mitigation

Status: PARTIALLY RESOLVED

What's Done:

• ✅ Step-up authentication middleware created (src/middleware/stepUpAuth.js)
• ✅ Access tokens include high_assurance claim after OTP verification
• ✅ Middleware checks for recent OTP or high assurance token

What's Missing:

• ❌ Step-up auth NOT applied to sensitive routes
• ❌ Sensitive operations in src/routes/userRoutes.js don't use requireRecentOtpOrReauth:
  • PUT /users/me - Profile updates (could change phone number)
  • DELETE /users/me/devices/:device_id - Device revocation
  • POST /users/me/logout-all-other-devices - Mass device logout

Risk Level: 🟡 MEDIUM

• Stolen access token can be used for sensitive operations within 15-minute window
• Attacker could revoke devices, update profile, etc.

Recommendation:

// Apply to sensitive routes:
router.put('/me', auth, requireRecentOtpOrReauth, async (req, res) => { ... });
router.delete('/me/devices/:device_id', auth, requireRecentOtpOrReauth, async (req, res) => { ... });
router.post('/me/logout-all-other-devices', auth, requireRecentOtpOrReauth, async (req, res) => { ... });

---

9. ⚠️ Secrets Management & Rotation

Status: PARTIALLY RESOLVED

What's Done:

• ✅ JWT key rotation structure implemented
• ✅ Support for multiple keys with kid (key ID)
• ✅ Graceful rotation without breaking existing tokens
• ✅ Code structure ready for secrets manager integration

What's Missing:

• ❌ Still reads secrets from .env file
• ❌ No integration with secrets manager (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, etc.)
• ❌ Manual key rotation process (no automation)
• ❌ Twilio credentials still in .env

Risk Level: 🟡 MEDIUM-HIGH

• If .env leaks or is committed to git, attacker can:
  • Forge JWTs
  • Send SMS via Twilio
  • Access database

Recommendation:

1. Immediate: Ensure .env is in .gitignore and never committed
2. Short-term: Use environment variables from secure deployment platform
3. Long-term: Integrate with secrets manager (see TODOs in src/services/jwtKeys.js)

TODO in Code:

• src/services/jwtKeys.js line 169: Example implementation for AWS Secrets Manager
• Need to implement loadKeysFromSecretsManager() function

---

10. ⚠️ Audit Logs Active Monitoring

Status: PARTIALLY RESOLVED

What's Done:

• ✅ Enhanced audit logging with risk levels (INFO, SUSPICIOUS, HIGH_RISK)
• ✅ Structured logging with metadata
• ✅ Anomaly detection helper function (checkAnomalies())
• ✅ Suspicious events logged (failed OTPs, suspicious refreshes, blocked IPs)

What's Missing:

• ❌ No active alerting/monitoring integration
• ❌ No automated alerts for HIGH_RISK events
• ❌ No integration with PagerDuty, Slack, email, etc.
• ❌ Anomaly detection only logs to console (line 183 in auditLogger.js)

Risk Level: 🟡 MEDIUM

• Attacks happen silently until manual log inspection
• No real-time notification of security events

Recommendation:

1. Immediate: Set up log aggregation (CloudWatch, Datadog, etc.)
2. Short-term: Implement alerting for HIGH_RISK events
3. Long-term: Integrate with SIEM system

TODO in Code:

• src/services/auditLogger.js line 183: // TODO: Trigger alert (email, webhook, etc.)
• src/services/auditLogger.js line 193: Example implementation for external alerting

---

11. ⚠️ Input Validation

Status: PARTIALLY RESOLVED

What's Done:

• ✅ Input validation middleware created (src/middleware/validation.js)
• ✅ Validation applied to all auth routes:
  • /auth/request-otp
  • /auth/verify-otp
  • /auth/refresh
  • /auth/logout

What's Missing:

• ❌ Validation NOT applied to user routes (src/routes/userRoutes.js):
  • PUT /users/me - No validation for name, user_type
  • DELETE /users/me/devices/:device_id - No validation for device_id param
  • POST /users/me/logout-all-other-devices - No validation for current_device_id

Risk Level: 🟢 LOW-MEDIUM

• Less critical than auth endpoints, but still important
• Could allow unexpected payloads or edge-case bugs

Recommendation:

// Add validation middleware to user routes:
const { validateUpdateProfileBody, validateDeviceIdParam } = require('../middleware/validation');

router.put('/me', auth, validateUpdateProfileBody, async (req, res) => { ... });
router.delete('/me/devices/:device_id', auth, validateDeviceIdParam, async (req, res) => { ... });

---

❌ Unaddressed Attack Scenarios

12. ❌ Database Compromise

Status: NOT ADDRESSED

Risk:

• If database is compromised, attacker can:
  • See phone numbers, device metadata, audit logs
  • Correlate patterns for phishing/SIM-swap attacks
  • Access user data

Mitigation Needed:

• ✅ Already using parameterized queries (good)
• ❌ No encryption at rest for sensitive fields
• ❌ No field-level encryption for PII
• ❌ No database access logging/auditing

Recommendation:

• Encrypt sensitive fields (phone numbers) at rest
• Implement database access logging
• Use database encryption (TDE, etc.)
• Regular security audits

---

13. ❌ Man-in-the-Middle (Non-HTTPS)

Status: NOT ADDRESSED (Infrastructure concern)

Risk:

• If client app talks to service over HTTP (no TLS):
  • Attacker can intercept access/refresh tokens
  • Attacker can intercept OTPs
  • Full account compromise

Mitigation:

• ✅ Server assumes TLS termination in front (reverse proxy)
• ❌ No enforcement of HTTPS-only connections
• ❌ No HSTS headers
• ❌ No certificate pinning guidance

Recommendation:

• Enforce HTTPS at reverse proxy/load balancer
• Add HSTS headers
• Document TLS requirements
• Consider certificate pinning for mobile apps

---

14. ❌ Misconfigured CORS + XSS

Status: PARTIALLY ADDRESSED

What's Done:

• ✅ CORS hardened with strict origin whitelisting
• ✅ Documentation warns about misconfiguration

What's Missing:

• ❌ No validation that CORS is properly configured in production
• ❌ No runtime checks for CORS misconfiguration
• ❌ No guidance for XSS prevention in frontend

Risk Level: 🟡 MEDIUM

• If frontend has XSS and CORS is misconfigured:
  • Attacker can use victim's tokens from malicious page
  • Account takeover possible

Recommendation:

• Add startup validation that CORS origins are configured in production
• Document XSS prevention best practices
• Consider Content Security Policy (CSP) headers

---

Summary Table

Issue	Status	Risk Level	Priority
1. Rate Limiting	✅ Resolved	-	-
2. OTP Logging	✅ Resolved	-	-
3. IP/Device Risk	✅ Resolved	-	-
4. Refresh Token Theft	✅ Resolved	-	-
5. JWT Claims	✅ Resolved	-	-
6. CORS	✅ Resolved	-	-
7. CSRF	✅ Documented	-	-
8. Access Token Replay	⚠️ Partial	🟡 Medium	HIGH
9. Secrets Management	⚠️ Partial	🟡 Medium-High	HIGH
10. Audit Monitoring	⚠️ Partial	🟡 Medium	MEDIUM
11. Input Validation	⚠️ Partial	🟢 Low-Medium	MEDIUM
12. Database Compromise	❌ Not Addressed	🔴 High	MEDIUM
13. MITM (HTTP)	❌ Not Addressed	🔴 High	LOW (Infra)
14. CORS + XSS	⚠️ Partial	🟡 Medium	LOW

---

Immediate Action Items (Priority Order)

🔴 HIGH PRIORITY

1. Apply Step-Up Auth to Sensitive Routes

   • Add requireRecentOtpOrReauth to user routes
   • Prevents access token replay attacks

2. Secrets Management

   • Move secrets to environment variables (not .env file)
   • Plan integration with secrets manager
   • Ensure .env is never committed

🟡 MEDIUM PRIORITY

3. Active Monitoring/Alerting

   • Set up alerts for HIGH_RISK audit events
   • Integrate with monitoring system (CloudWatch, Datadog, etc.)

4. Complete Input Validation

   • Add validation middleware to user routes
   • Validate all request parameters

🟢 LOW PRIORITY

5. Database Security

   • Plan encryption at rest
   • Implement database access logging

6. Infrastructure Security

   • Document TLS/HTTPS requirements
   • Add HSTS headers
   • Validate CORS configuration at startup

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Code Locations for Fixes

Step-Up Auth Application

File: src/routes/userRoutes.js

• Line 99: PUT /users/me - Add requireRecentOtpOrReauth
• Line 160: DELETE /users/me/devices/:device_id - Add requireRecentOtpOrReauth
• Line 203: POST /users/me/logout-all-other-devices - Add requireRecentOtpOrReauth

Input Validation

File: src/routes/userRoutes.js

• Add validation middleware imports
• Apply to all routes

Secrets Manager Integration

File: src/services/jwtKeys.js

• Line 169: Implement loadKeysFromSecretsManager() function
• Replace .env reads with secrets manager calls

Alerting Integration

File: src/services/auditLogger.js

• Line 183: Implement alert triggering
• Line 193: Add external alerting integration

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Conclusion

7 out of 14 issues are fully resolved ✅ 4 issues are partially resolved ⚠️ (need completion) 3 issues are not addressed ❌ (infrastructure/planning)

Overall Security Posture: 🟡 GOOD (with room for improvement)

The most critical remaining gaps are:

1. Step-up auth not applied to sensitive routes
2. Secrets still in .env file
3. No active monitoring/alerting

These should be addressed before production deployment.