# Security Hardening Implementation Summary ## Overview This document summarizes the security hardening improvements added to the authentication service. All changes are marked with clear comments in the code for easy identification. ## 1. OTP Logging Safety ✅ **Implementation:** `src/utils/otpLogger.js` - **Safe OTP logging helper** that only logs in development mode - Never logs OTPs to production or centralized logging systems - Uses `logOtpForDebug()` function that: - Only logs when `NODE_ENV === 'development'` - Masks phone numbers (shows only last 4 digits) - Clearly marked as `[DEV-ONLY]` **Updated Files:** - `src/services/smsService.js` - Now uses safe logging instead of direct `console.log` **Configuration:** - No configuration needed - automatically detects environment ## 2. IP/Device Risk Controls ✅ **Implementation:** `src/services/riskScoring.js` - **IP blocking**: Blocks logins from configured CIDR ranges (private IPs, test ranges) - **Risk scoring**: Calculates risk score based on: - IP address changes - Device changes - User agent changes - **Suspicious refresh detection**: Detects when refresh tokens are used from different environments **Features:** - Configurable blocked IP ranges via `BLOCKED_IP_RANGES` environment variable - Optional OTP re-verification requirement for suspicious refreshes - Risk scores logged to audit trail **Updated Files:** - `src/routes/authRoutes.js` - Integrated IP blocking and risk scoring **Configuration:** ```bash BLOCKED_IP_RANGES=10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12 # Comma-separated CIDR blocks REQUIRE_OTP_ON_SUSPICIOUS_REFRESH=true # Require OTP on suspicious refresh ``` ## 3. Access Token Replay Mitigation ✅ **Implementation:** `src/middleware/stepUpAuth.js` - **Step-up authentication middleware** for sensitive operations - Requires either: - Recent OTP verification (within configurable window) - High assurance flag in token (set after OTP verification) - Access tokens now include `high_assurance` claim after OTP verification **Usage:** ```javascript router.post('/users/me/change-phone', authMiddleware, requireRecentOtpOrReauth, async (req, res) => { ... } ); ``` **Updated Files:** - `src/services/tokenService.js` - Added `highAssurance` option to `signAccessToken()` - `src/middleware/authMiddleware.js` - Extracts `high_assurance` claim from token - `src/routes/authRoutes.js` - Issues tokens with `highAssurance: true` after OTP verification **Configuration:** ```bash STEP_UP_OTP_WINDOW_MINUTES=5 # Time window for "recent" OTP (default: 5) ``` ## 4. Refresh Token Theft Mitigation ✅ **Implementation:** Enhanced in `src/routes/authRoutes.js` and `src/services/riskScoring.js` - **Environment fingerprinting**: Tracks IP, user-agent, device ID - **Suspicious refresh detection**: Compares current refresh with previous environment - **Optional OTP requirement**: Can require OTP re-verification for suspicious refreshes - **Enhanced logging**: All suspicious refreshes logged with risk scores **Features:** - Detects IP changes, device changes, user-agent changes - Calculates risk score (0-100) - Logs suspicious events to audit trail - Optionally blocks suspicious refreshes until OTP verification **Configuration:** ```bash REQUIRE_OTP_ON_SUSPICIOUS_REFRESH=true # Require OTP on suspicious refresh ``` ## 5. JWT Key Rotation & Secrets Management ✅ **Implementation:** `src/services/jwtKeys.js` - **Multiple signing keys** with key IDs (kid) in JWT header - **Active key for signing**: Configurable via `JWT_ACTIVE_KEY_ID` - **Multiple verification keys**: Supports key rotation without breaking existing tokens - **Strict claims validation**: Validates `iss`, `aud`, `exp`, `iat`, `nbf` **Key Features:** - Tokens include `kid` in header for key identification - Supports multiple keys for graceful rotation - Validates issuer and audience claims - Backward compatible with legacy single-key setup **Updated Files:** - `src/services/tokenService.js` - Uses new key management system - `src/middleware/authMiddleware.js` - Validates tokens with key rotation support **Configuration:** ```bash JWT_ACTIVE_KEY_ID=1 # Key ID for signing new tokens JWT_KEYS_JSON='{"1":"secret1","2":"secret2"}' # Multiple keys for rotation JWT_ISSUER=farm-auth-service # Issuer claim JWT_AUDIENCE=mobile-app # Audience claim JWT_REFRESH_KEY_ID=1 # Key ID for refresh tokens (optional) ``` **TODO for Production:** - Load keys from secrets manager (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, etc.) - See comments in `src/services/jwtKeys.js` for implementation example ## 6. Stricter JWT Claims Validation ✅ **Implementation:** `src/services/jwtKeys.js` - `validateTokenClaims()` - **Issuer (iss) validation**: Ensures tokens are from correct service - **Audience (aud) validation**: Ensures tokens are for correct application - **Expiration (exp) validation**: Already handled, but now with clock skew tolerance - **Issued at (iat) validation**: Prevents tokens issued in the future - **Not before (nbf) validation**: Validates if present **Features:** - Configurable clock skew (default: 60 seconds) - Centralized validation function - Used in all token verification paths **Configuration:** - Claims values set via `JWT_ISSUER` and `JWT_AUDIENCE` environment variables ## 7. CORS Hardening ✅ **Implementation:** `src/index.js` - **Strict origin whitelisting**: Only allows explicitly configured origins - **No wildcard support**: Never uses `*` when credentials are involved - **Clear warnings**: Logs when allowing all origins (development only) - **Production requirement**: CORS origins must be configured in production **Features:** - Development mode: Allows all origins only if none configured (with warning) - Production mode: Requires explicit origin whitelist - Validates origin on every request - Blocks unauthorized origins with 403 **Configuration:** ```bash CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://app.example.com,https://api.example.com ``` **WARNING:** Never use `*` as an allowed origin when credentials or tokens are involved. ## 8. CSRF Future-Proofing ✅ **Implementation:** `CSRF_NOTES.md` - **Documentation**: Comprehensive notes on CSRF protection - **Current status**: No CSRF protection needed (using Bearer tokens) - **Future guidance**: Implementation strategy if moving to cookies **Key Points:** - Current implementation (Bearer tokens) is CSRF-safe - If moving to HTTP-only cookies, CSRF protection becomes mandatory - Recommended: SameSite cookies + CSRF token validation ## 9. Enhanced Audit Logging ✅ **Implementation:** `src/services/auditLogger.js` - **Risk levels**: INFO, SUSPICIOUS, HIGH_RISK - **Enhanced logging**: All events include risk level - **Anomaly detection**: Helper functions for pattern detection - **Suspicious event logging**: - Multiple failed OTP attempts - Suspicious refresh events - Blocked IP logins **Features:** - Automatic `risk_level` column creation in `auth_audit` table - Structured logging with metadata - Easy integration with external alerting systems **Updated Files:** - `src/routes/authRoutes.js` - Uses enhanced audit logging throughout **Logging Functions:** - `logAuthEvent()` - General auth event logging - `logSuspiciousOtpAttempt()` - Failed OTP attempts - `logBlockedIpLogin()` - Blocked IP logins - `logSuspiciousRefresh()` - Suspicious refresh events - `checkAnomalies()` - Pattern detection (for future alerting) **TODO for Production:** - Integrate with external alerting (PagerDuty, Slack, email) - See comments in `src/services/auditLogger.js` for implementation example ## 10. Input Validation ✅ **Implementation:** `src/middleware/validation.js` - **Centralized validation**: Reusable middleware for all endpoints - **Type checking**: Validates field types - **Length limits**: Prevents DoS via large payloads - **Format validation**: Validates phone numbers, OTP codes, etc. **Validation Middleware:** - `validateRequestOtpBody()` - OTP request validation - `validateVerifyOtpBody()` - OTP verification validation - `validateRefreshTokenBody()` - Refresh token validation - `validateLogoutBody()` - Logout validation **Features:** - Validates required fields - Validates field types - Validates string lengths - Validates formats (phone, OTP code) - Prevents oversized payloads **Updated Files:** - `src/routes/authRoutes.js` - All endpoints use validation middleware ## Environment Variables Summary ### Required ```bash DATABASE_URL=postgresql://... JWT_ACCESS_SECRET=... # Or use JWT_KEYS_JSON JWT_REFRESH_SECRET=... # Or use JWT_KEYS_JSON ``` ### Optional (with defaults) ```bash # JWT Configuration JWT_ACTIVE_KEY_ID=1 JWT_KEYS_JSON='{"1":"secret1","2":"secret2"}' JWT_ISSUER=farm-auth-service JWT_AUDIENCE=mobile-app JWT_REFRESH_KEY_ID=1 # Security Hardening BLOCKED_IP_RANGES=10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12 REQUIRE_OTP_ON_SUSPICIOUS_REFRESH=false STEP_UP_OTP_WINDOW_MINUTES=5 # CORS CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://app.example.com # Rate Limiting (from previous implementation) OTP_REQ_PHONE_10MIN_LIMIT=3 OTP_REQ_PHONE_DAY_LIMIT=10 OTP_REQ_IP_10MIN_LIMIT=20 OTP_REQ_IP_DAY_LIMIT=100 OTP_VERIFY_MAX_ATTEMPTS=5 OTP_VERIFY_FAILED_PER_HOUR_LIMIT=10 OTP_TTL_SECONDS=120 ``` ## Code Markers All security hardening code is marked with comments: - `// === SECURITY HARDENING: OTP LOGGING ===` - `// === SECURITY HARDENING: IP/DEVICE RISK ===` - `// === SECURITY HARDENING: JWT KEY ROTATION ===` - `// === SECURITY HARDENING: ACCESS TOKEN REPLAY MITIGATION ===` - `// === SECURITY HARDENING: REFRESH TOKEN THEFT MITIGATION ===` - `// === SECURITY HARDENING: AUDIT LOGS & ANOMALY FLAGS ===` - `// === SECURITY HARDENING: INPUT VALIDATION ===` - `// === SECURITY HARDENING: CORS ===` - `// === SECURITY HARDENING: CSRF (FUTURE-PROOFING) ===` ## Testing Recommendations 1. **OTP Logging**: Verify OTPs are not logged in production 2. **IP Blocking**: Test with blocked IP ranges 3. **Risk Scoring**: Test with different IPs/devices 4. **JWT Key Rotation**: Test token verification with multiple keys 5. **CORS**: Test with allowed and blocked origins 6. **Input Validation**: Test with invalid payloads 7. **Audit Logging**: Verify risk levels are logged correctly ## Next Steps 1. **Secrets Management**: Integrate with AWS Secrets Manager or HashiCorp Vault 2. **Alerting**: Set up alerts for HIGH_RISK events 3. **Monitoring**: Monitor audit logs for suspicious patterns 4. **Key Rotation**: Implement automated key rotation process 5. **CSRF**: If moving to cookies, implement CSRF protection ## Files Created - `src/utils/otpLogger.js` - Safe OTP logging - `src/services/riskScoring.js` - IP/device risk scoring - `src/services/jwtKeys.js` - JWT key management - `src/middleware/validation.js` - Input validation - `src/services/auditLogger.js` - Enhanced audit logging - `src/middleware/stepUpAuth.js` - Step-up authentication - `CSRF_NOTES.md` - CSRF protection documentation - `SECURITY_HARDENING_SUMMARY.md` - This file ## Files Modified - `src/services/smsService.js` - Safe OTP logging - `src/services/tokenService.js` - JWT key rotation, claims validation - `src/middleware/authMiddleware.js` - JWT key rotation support - `src/routes/authRoutes.js` - All security features integrated - `src/index.js` - CORS hardening - `src/config.js` - New environment variables documented